

**From:** PSR(S)2, PSR(C)2, PSR(IC)3

**Sent:** Friday, 27 August 2010 3:47 p.m.

**To:** PSR(S)2, PSR(C)2, PSR(IC)3

**Subject:** FW: ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ External Release Update Obj Burnham Op 21 Aug 10 Update 4

CLASSIFICATION: ~~ISAF SECRET~~

FYI

100826-IS-TF81 INTSUM 001-10.doc  
100822-IS-AWT INS ID.PPTX

**From:** PSR(S)2, PSR(C)2, PSR(IC)3

**Sent:** Thursday, 26 August 2010 11:27 p.m.

**To:** PSR(S)2, PSR(C)2, PSR(IC)3

**Subject:** ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ External Release Update Obj Burnham Op 21 Aug 10 Update 4

CLASSIFICATION: ~~ISAF SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION: ~~ISAF SECRET~~

Hi Boss and PSR(S)2, PS

There have certainly been some developments today!

Firstly yesterday I put you wrong in that I stated an Investigation was being conducted. In fact what has been occurring has been an IAT (Initial Assessment Team) has been convened to look at the operation and decide if an investigation into a CIVCAS incident needs to occur. Yesterday the IAT interviewed the District Governor of TWB.

PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

PSR(S)1, PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

Reference to content of partner-  
controlled video of operation

All in all for TF81 this is good news. It has to date verified that our actions were correct and in accordance with the threat presented. This will likely be looked at by IJC from two fronts. Actions by the ground force, (no problems I can see) and actions by the Airborne force, (poss CIVCAS caused in potential accidental impact of rounds onto house identified in slide 1). There is no indication at this stage on the evidence presented to the IAT that there was anything other than the correct application of force to a clear and present INS threat, and that any CIVCAS caused by the AWT would be collateral and unintended. This point is still to be verified.

Tomorrow Brig <sup>PSR(S)1, PSR(IC)4</sup> will brief Gen <sup>PSR(S)1, PSR(IC)4</sup> on this event. The Intsum above has been prepared for ISAF SOF Staff to prepare a verbal brief for Brig <sup>PSR(S)1, PSR(IC)4</sup> to give to <sup>PSR(S)</sup>. It wraps up what we knew before the event, what we now know after the event and what we predict may occur next. I briefed Brig <sup>PSR(S)1, PSR(IC)4</sup> tonight on the situation to date. He feels that <sup>PSR(S)</sup> may be very interested in A). the CIVCAS issue which is being run to ground by IJC staff and B). what is the ongoing threat up there and what would the next step be.

I have to say that today has felt for the OC and I like a large weight has been lifted. We have both been personally feeling the weight of potential CIVCAS by TF81 and now having reviewed the tapes, we are both reassured that TF81 actions throughout the operation were of the highest calibre. This is not to say that a CIVCAS has not occurred however if verified it will be as a result of collateral activities from the AH64 weapon problems rather than incorrect application of force. This called for a quiet Whisky and I can tell you it never tasted so good. I will sleep well tonight.

Regards

<sup>PSR(S)2, I</sup>

100826-IS-TF81 INTSUM 001-10.doc  
100822-IS-AWT INS ID.PPTX

100826-IS-TF81 INTSUM 001-10.doc  
100822-IS-AWT INS ID.PPTX

~~ISAF SECRET~~

## INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY REPORT

**Classification:** ~~ISAF SECRET~~  
**Priority:** ROUTINE  
**DTG:** 262030D\*AUG 10  
**Reference:** 001- 10

### INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY REPORT ON OBJ BURNHAM 22 AUG 10

#### Executive Summary

1. ISAF SOF conducted a partnered Op in TIRIGAN Village, BAGHLAN Province to in response to an identified growing INS threat to the stability of the KAHMARD/GHANDAK area of BAMYAN Province. The Op was conducted successfully which resulted in eight to nine INS killed, four to five INS wounded and weapons and ammunition destroyed. It is assessed that this Op had a disruptive effect on an INS cell that has spent the last three years Op with impunity. Initial post Op reporting was from LN assessed as TB sympathetic which resulted in greatly exaggerated BDA being reported in OSINT within 24 hrs. Consolidated reporting reflects friendly force operational debrief with the addition of one to two LN having been wounded. Indications are that potentially up to three TB groups are planning to conduct revenge attacks against GIRoA/ISAF to occur at the end of Ramadan/EID.

#### Pre-Operation

2. ISAF SOF has been following a number of targets in the BAMYAN/BAGHLAN area since April 2010, following concern by NZPRT on a number of INS attacks that were targeting ANSF/CF/LN in the KAHMARD, GHANDAK and TWB areas. These INS included <sup>PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4, PSR(S)1</sup> (JPEL Pending) and QARI MUSA (RTAF1861). Both of these INS are believed to have moved to PAK in early Jul 10 following the IED attack against an LBG (Civilian mining Coy) vehicle. (NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 012/10 dated 6 July 2010).

3. HUMINT reports indicted that these INS continued to contact other TB members in BAMYAN/BAGHLAN from PAK. Historic and other reporting has corroborated that this INS group has been involved in various attacks against ANSF/CF/LN over recent years. This included the murder on an ANP officer on 29 Apr 10. (NZPRT BAMYAN INTSUM 122/10 date 02 May 2010).

4. Following the IED attack against NZPRT on 3 Aug 10, various HUMINT reports identified 14 individuals involved. The three individual leaders were

~~ISAF SECRET~~

000043



~~ISAF SECRET~~

identified as KALTA (RTAF2307), NEMATULLAH (RTAF2306) and QARI MIRAJ (RTAF2305). These individuals are all linked to PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4, PSR(S)1 and QARI MUSA groups.

5. Reporting indicated that INS were planning to conduct further attacks against ANSF/CF/LN following the successful attack of 3 Aug. POL indicated that these INS were conducting a six day patrol cycle that included movement between TIRIGAN, TALA and BAFEK Villages before meeting to coordinate attacks. It was assessed that a meeting would be taking place on the night of either 21/22 or 22/23 Aug in TIRIGAN village. When HUMINT reported that KALTA and NEMATULLAH were located in TIRIGAN village on 21 Aug it was assessed that the scheduled meeting was taking place.

#### Post Operation

Confidential  
source

6. Initial reporting from OSINT indicated that up to 40 innocent LN had been killed by aerial bombardment. **COMMENT:** What is assessed to be circular reporting since has perpetuated initial reports of up to four women/children having been killed. PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 reported that two LN, possibly linked to this operation, are at PEK hospital. **END COMMENT.**

7. Consolidated reflections following the operation indicate that between eight and nine people have been killed, with three to five people wounded. The following table outlines a consolidated list of individuals who have been reported as killed; wounded or injured to date.

Probably Killed	Possibly Killed	Injured
PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 (INS) father of PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4	Sister of PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4	Son of PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 (INS)
PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 (INS)		(Possibly) Daughter of PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4
2 x Sons of PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 both (INS)		(Possibly) Unk Female
Son of PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 (INS)		PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 (INS)
1 x Unidentified male (INS)		PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 (INS)
PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 (NFI)		
PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 (NFI)		

8. There are reports that NEMATULLAH and KALTA are still alive and may have been involved in the funerals which occurred on 23 Aug, with up to 400 attendees. Some of those that attended were reported to be armed with RPG, PKM and AK47's.

~~ISAF SECRET~~

In the table above, names and other details that identify individuals have been redacted from this document for reasons of privacy and because some identifying information may have been obtained by means that would cause prejudice to protected interests if disclosed. However, and noting that some individuals have since been publicly identified, the individuals identified in this table appear to correlate with some of those who have been publicly identified.

000044

~~ISAF SECRET~~

9. A report stated that 12 weapons, 11 mines and ammo were destroyed in the operation at KALTA's house. **COMMENT:** Two weapons, seven RPG rounds and a quantity of ammunition (2 x belt 7.62mm, 1 x box 14.5mm) was removed and destroyed by FF during the operation. It is likely that additional weapons were destroyed when INS were engaged by Air Assets. **END COMMENT.**

10. Initial reporting, both OSINT (NY Times) and HUMINT, indicated that a number of houses, up to 20, had been destroyed by fire. ISR during the post operation observed two houses on fire. **COMMENT:** The first fire was started by splash from the destruction of weapons by EOD. The second is assessed to have been started by an unattended open fire left by the occupants. **END COMMENT.**

11. Several reports indicate that TB plan to attack PRT patrols and ANP CP's as revenge for the Op conducted in TIRIGAN. Reports indicate that up to three groups are probably preparing to operate in the BAMYAN/BAGHLAN area, these are:

- a. NEMATULLAH Group – 40 to 45 TB strong, from TIRIGAN Village, Abdullah KALTA is part of this group
- b. Qari MIRAJ Group – 12 to 20 TB strong, from TIRIGAN Village, are in good condition, PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 is part of this group.
- c. PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4 - 20 to 25 TB strong, from PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

**COMMENT:** It is probable that the TB will plan revenge attacks against GIROA/ISAF targets in BAMYAN. It is likely that INS will meet in the next 72 hrs to plan further attacks to coincide with the end of Ramadan/EID. Probable targets include ISH PESHTA CP and Route CAROLINA from ISH PESHTA South to GHANDAK Village. **END COMMENT.**

~~ISAF SECRET~~

000045

**INTENTIONALLY  
LEFT  
BLANK**

000046

~~ISAF SECRET~~

PSR(S)1

Still image from  
partner-controlled  
video

~~ISAF SECRET~~

000048

PSR(S)1

Still image from  
partner-controlled  
video